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PART I 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concepts of globalisation and fragmentation present both challenges and opportunities for 
international environmental governance.  They are, nevertheless, contradictory concepts. On the 
one hand globalisation emphasises notions of interdependence and linkage between problems 
and solutions.  Within the field of environmental protection the concept of ecological 
interdependence has long since been recognised and the globalisation of international 
environmental law is arguably a necessary component of modern international environmental 
governance.  On the other hand, fragmentation of international law – as characterised by “the 
emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule complexes, legal institutions 
and spheres of legal practice”1 – emphasises the isolation and disconnect between regimes and 
institutions.  Nevertheless, both globalisation and fragmentation create similar challenges to 
international environmental governance: how to manage the interaction between environmental 
regimes so as to minimise unnecessary conflation of, and conflict between, their regulatory 
mandates.  It is this question that provides the central theme of this paper.   
Rather than focusing on the application of treaty law to managing conflated and 
conflicted treaty mandates, this paper will instead examine selected international environmental 
governance strategies, which are in various stages of development, and which are designed not 
just to manage conflict but to maximise the benefits of conflation.  One particular strategy will 
be examined in this paper: the creation of formal cooperative arrangements or other institutional 
linkages between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).  Institutional linkages of course 
occur beyond this narrow category and include informal linkages as well as cooperative 
agreements between MEAs and environmental institutions such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), but these other 
linkages will not be considered as part of this paper due to space constraints. The formal 
institutional linkages explored in Part II of this paper are divided into three categories; formal 
agreements facilitating institutional cooperation; institutional integrated management; and 
cooperative mechanisms connected with compliance issues.  It will be concluded that the 
creation of cooperative arrangements and other institutional connections provides an important 
mechanism by which the problems associated with fragmentation can be minimised and, more 
significantly, they can maximise connections and overlaps between regimes, in order to improve 
international environmental governance.  Nevertheless, closer cooperation and institutional 
integration raises a number of questions relating to the accountability of the regime or institution 
to its states parties and, more generally, the legitimacy of the regime.  Moreover, the impact of 
these new forms of international governance potentially extends beyond the realm of 
international environmental law.  As Part III of this paper will demonstrate, these governance 
strategies challenge the fundamentals of the system itself; who we regard as participants within 
the system, the sources of international law and even its ultimate basis in consent.   
 
2. GLOBALISATION AND FRAGMENTATION: THE COMMON CHALLENGE 
 
It is estimated that there are over 500 global and regional multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) in force today2 and whilst this undoubtedly represents a measure of success in 
                                                 
1 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/L.682) (13 April 20006) at para. 8. 
2 Management Review of Environmental Governance within the United Nations System, prepared by Tadanori Inomata, Joint 
Inspection Unit, Geneva, 2008 (JIU/REP/2008/3) at para. 42.  There are of course many more soft law 
instruments, joint work programmes and action plans that also contribute towards environmental protection and 
constitute another component of the international environmental governance framework. 
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addressing environmental concerns3 the number of new treaties adopted has been criticised as 
leading to so-called “treaty congestion”4 and fragmentation.  Fragmentation in of itself does not 
constitute an inherent positive or negative value judgment. Some commentators have suggested 
that it reflects an “unprecedented normative and institutional expansion of international law”5 or 
a “positive demonstration of the responsiveness of legal imagination to social change.”6  Others 
have viewed fragmentation as “leading to inefficiencies, a lack of synergy... inconsistent or 
contradictory standards”7 or even jeopardising “the credibility, reliability and consequently, the 
authority of international law.”8   
 What cannot be denied is that both globalisation and fragmentation of international 
environmental law has resulted in the creation of regimes and institutions with similar or even 
conflated regulatory mandates giving rise to the risk of duplication of, divergence and even 
conflict between, standards and legal obligations.  For example, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol9 
promotes the enhancement of carbon sinks such as forests for the purpose of climate change 
mitigation.10  Yet an interpretation of the Protocol that permits or even promotes planting 
homogenous young trees at the expense of managing old growth forests would potentially lead 
to a conflict with obligations established under the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.11 Similarly, 
restrictions on the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) under the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer12 led to a significant increase in the production of 
alternatives to ozone depleting substances such as hydrochloroflurocarbons (HCFCs), which are 
10,000 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, and thus carry significant 
potential to undermine the aims and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol.13   
Even where no direct conflict between treaty obligations occurs, the creation of 
divergent standards or the development of different managerial approaches to environmental 
problems carries the potential to undermine the effectiveness of all the regimes concerned.  For 
example, activities involving iron fertilization experiments for climate change mitigation and 
other purposes have recently come to the attention of the parties of the 1996 Protocol to the 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless it has been noted by numerous commentators that despite the steady increase in the number of 
treaties and other instruments adopted for the purpose of environmental protection, paradoxically, the degradation 
of the natural environment has got worse.  See for example Duncan French, “Managing global change for 
sustainable development: technology, community and multilateral environmental agreements” 7 (2007) International 
Environmental Agreements 209 – 235 at 209 – 210. 
4 Edith Brown Weiss, “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World 
Order” 81 (1992 – 1993) Georgetown Law Journal 675 – 710 at 697. 
5 Mario Prost and Paul Kingsley Clark, “Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much 
does the Multiplication of International Organisations Really Matter?” 5 (2006) Chinese Journal of International Law 341 
– 370 at 343. 
6 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties” 15 (2002) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553 – 579 at 575. 
7 Phillipe Roche and Franz Zaver Perrez, “International Environmental Governance: The Strive Towards a 
Comprehensive, Coherent, Effective and Efficient Environmental Regime” 16 (2005) Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 1 - 25 at 15 – 16. 
8 Gerhard Hafner, “Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law” 25 (2003 – 2004) Michigan 
Journal of International Law 849 – 863 at 856.  See further Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Regime 
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” 25 (2003 – 2004) Michigan Journal 
of International Law 999 – 1046; Martti Koskenniemi, “The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics” 70 (2007) Modern Law Review 1 – 30; Christian Leathley, “An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity” 40 (2007 – 2008) New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 259 – 306. 
9 Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto), 37 (1998) ILM 22 (in force 18 June 2001). 
10 Ibid, Article 2(1)(a)(ii). 
11 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 (1992) ILM 818 (in force 29 December 1993). 
12 1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal) 26 (1987) ILM 1150 (in force 1 January 
1989). 
13 As a response to this the parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol agreed in 2007 to bring forward the final phase 
out date of HCFCs.  See Decision XIX/6 of the MOP of the Montreal Protocol, UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7. 
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London Convention14 and the parties of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.  In 2008 the parties 
to the London Protocol declared that the remit of both the Protocol and the Convention 
includes fertilization activities and, that legitimate scientific research activities should be regarded 
as placement for a purpose other than mere disposal thereof under Article 1.4.2.2 of the 
Protocol.15 The parties to the Protocol are currently in the process of developing a Risk 
Assessment Framework designed to guide fertilization research activities16 as well as exploring 
various options for regulation ranging from a non-binding statement of concern through to an 
amendment of the definition of dumping under the Protocol and a free standing article relating 
to fertilization.17  Simultaneously, the parties to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention adopted 
Decision IX/16 in 2008,18 which requested that all parties ensure that ocean fertilization activities 
do not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify those activities.  
Furthermore, Decision XI/16 requires a global, transparent and effective regulatory mechanism 
be established prior to carrying out all fertilization activities with the exception of small scale 
scientific research activities taking place within coastal waters.  Although not contradictory per 
se, it must be noted that the parties to the 1996 Protocol, in contrast to the parties to the 
Biodiversity Convention, have yet to exclude non-regulatory options for the management of 
fertilization activities, and, in their consideration of these activities to date, the parties to the 1996 
Protocol have made no distinction between coastal and open waters.  Apart from the obvious 
duplication of efforts associated with developing a regulatory response to ocean fertilization, the 
divergence in approaches between the parties to the 1996 London Protocol and the 1992 
Biodiversity Convention may lead to confusion and, if continued, risk undermining the 
effectiveness of action undertaken by both instruments.  
However, it has also been recognised that conflation and overlap between mandates 
provide significant potential for improving synergy between obligations, policies and 
programmes as well as opportunities for mutually supportive and more effective implementation.  
For example, although the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Fauna and Flora (CITES)19 is generally regarded as one of the most successful of wildlife treaties, 
its mandate is constrained to regulating trade in wildlife.  Nevertheless, on numerous occasions 
CITES has adopted trade-related restrictions in connection with species that are subject to 
conservation measures under other regimes such as such as the 1979 Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS)20 in order to strengthen and supplement those 
measures.21   
                                                 
14 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, 36 (1997) ILM 7 (in force 24 March 2006) 
15
 Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008).  The parties to the Protocol went on to determine that ocean fertilization activities for 
purposes other than research should be currently regarded as contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol. 
16 See the Annex attached to the Report of the Ocean Fertilization Working Group (LC/SG 32 WP.7 (28 May 
2009). 
17 See the Report of the First Meeting of the LP Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working Group of Ocean 
Fertilization (LC/COP2/2/5 (20 February 2009). 
18 Decision IX/16 (2008) Biodiversity and Climate Change, para. C.4.  
19 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington) 12 (1973) 
ILM 1085 (in force 1 July 1975). 
20 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn) 19 (1980) ILM 15 (in force 1 
November 1983). 
21 John Lanchbety, “The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES): Responding to Calls for Action from Other Nature Conservation Schemes” in Sebastian Oberthür and 
Thomas Gehring (eds) Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International 
and EU Policies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2006) 157 – 179 at 163.  Lanchbety provides two case 
studies illustrating the synergy between CITES and other wildlife instruments: the protection of the Houbara 
Bustard (in conjunction with the CMS); and the protection of the vicuña (in conjunction with the 1979 Convention 
for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuña, Burhenne (eds), International Environmental Law: Multilateral 
Treaties (Berlin: 1974) 979:94 (in force 19 March 1982). 
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Unsurprisingly, the identification of mechanisms and techniques for managing the risks 
and maximising the potential associated with the impacts of both globalisation and 
fragmentation on international environmental law has been given significant attention by 
international institutions, environmental regimes, policy-makers and commentators in recent 
years.  Two broad approaches to managing conflation and conflict can be identified: the first 
approach draws on the international rules and principles relating to the interpretation and 
application of treaties and focuses on managing conflict between regimes; the second approach 
seeks to utilise and develop environmental governance mechanisms, not only to manage conflict 
between regimes, but also to maximise the benefits that can be derived from conflated and 
overlapping mandates.22  The work of the International Law Commission on the fragmentation 
of international law23 largely focuses on the issue of conflict between regimes and the extent to 
which treaty-based solutions might be utilised to resolve them.  By contrast, this article will focus 
on the identification of governance-based mechanisms for managing conflated and overlapping 
regimes, with a view to not only minimising conflict, but to improve the overall effectiveness of 
international environmental law. 
International environmental governance is a well established field of research for 
commentators and policy-makers alike.  Whilst academic enquiry focuses primarily on the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of international environmental governance,24 policy-makers are more 
directly concerned with reform.  No less than four major international environmental 
governance reform processes and reviews have been undertaken during the last ten years and 
numerous smaller studies have been carried out by multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) acting individually or collectively.  It is ironic that the process of international 
environmental governance review is as fragmented as the system of governance under review!    
The most extensive review process to date was initiated by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) in 2000 with the adoption of the Malmö Ministerial Declaration, which 
called for greater coherence and coordination among international environmental law 
instruments.25 An open-ended intergovernmental group of ministers was established in 2001 and 
was tasked with undertaking a comprehensive policy oriented assessment of existing institutional 
weaknesses as well as future needs and options for strengthened environmental governance.26  
The report of the open-ended group of ministers was adopted at the Seventh Special Session of 
the Global Ministerial Environmental Forum in 2002.27  After languishing for a number of years 
the review process was revitalised in 2009 when the decision was taken to establish a group of 
regionally representative group of ministers or high-level representatives to develop a set of 
options for improving international governance to be presented at the Eleventh Special Session 
in February 2010.28  The 2009 report of the Group of Consultative Ministers29 was endorsed at 
                                                 
22 Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflict in International Environmental Law (Berlin: Springer) (2003) at 119. 
23
 See Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/L.682) (13 April 20006). 
24 See Daniel Bodansky, “The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for Global 
International Environmental Law” 93 (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 – 624; Steven Bernstein, 
“Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance” 1 (2005) Journal of International Law and International Relations 139 
– 166. 
25 The Malmö Ministerial Declaration was adopted on the occasion of the first Global Ministerial Environmental 
Forum (established by UNGA Resolution 53/242 Report of the Secretary General on Environment and Human Settlements, 
28 July 1999). 
26 Decision 21/21 International Environmental Governance (Report of the Governing Council on the work of its Twenty-
first Session, 5 – 9 February 2001).   
27 Decision SS.VII/1 International Environmental Governance (Report of the Seventh Special Session / Global Ministerial 
Environmental Forum, 13 – 15 February 2002). 
28 Decision 25/4 International Environmental Governance (Proceedings of the Governing Council / Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum at its Twenty-fifth Session, 16 – 20 February 2009). 
29 The Consultative Group met twice during 2009; the first meeting was in Belgrade, 27 – 28 June 2009 and the 
second meeting was in Rome, 28 – 29 October 2009.  See  ‘The Belgrade Process’ Developing a set of options for improving 
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the Eleventh Special Session30 and a second Group of Consultative Ministers was established at 
that meeting to consider broader reform options.  This group is due to report to the Twenty-
sixth session of the Governing Council in 2011.31 Simultaneously but separately, two further 
review processes were initiated by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in September 2005.32  The first resulted in the Delivering as One: Report of 
the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of Development, Humanitarian 
Assistance and the Environment33 and the second has led to the initiation of the so-called Informal 
Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework for the United Nations Environment 
Activities.34  A fourth review of international environmental governance was subsequently 
initiated by the Joint Inspection Unit of the UN and its highly critical report of the current 
system was released in 2008.35  Finally, it should be noted that a number of MEAs including 
CITES, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)36 have engaged – with varying degrees of intensity – in internal 
governance review processes.37  
Despite their various origins and disparate mandates the ensuing reports produced by 
these review processes demonstrate considerable synergy in the problems they identify and the 
reforms they propose.  A common theme running throughout all these reports is the challenges 
and the opportunities presented by the large number of MEAs operating within the field of 
environmental protection.  All reports recommend that the strengthening of linkages and 
institutional connections between MEAs constitute a key component of international 
governance reform.  And it is these institutional and formal connections between MEAs that will 
be explored in the remainder of this article.  
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION AND THE CONCEPT OF „LINKAGE‟ 
 
Institutional interaction and “the idea of linkage emerged as a response to the problem of 
managing global dilemmas in an anarchic world that is governed by weak and fragmented 
international institutions.  Linkage can help in coping with this governance “deficit” by 
                                                                                                                                                        
International Environmental Governance, prepared by the UNEP Executive Director, September 2009 and presented at 
the Second meeting of the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives on International 
Environmental Governance, Rome, 26 – 29 October 2009; Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives Set 
of options for improving international environmental governance, Second meeting of the Consultative Group of Ministers or 
High-level Representatives on International Environmental Governance, Rome, 26 – 29 October 2009, 
UNEP/GCSS.XI/4. 
30 Decision SS.XI/1 International Environmental Governance (Report of the Governing Council / Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum at its Eleventh Special Session, 24 – 26 February 2010). 
31 Ibid at paras. 5 – 8. 
32 GA Resolution A/Res/60/1 (16 September 2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome at para. 169. 
33 UN General Assembly Resolution A/61/583 (20 November 2006). 
34 See the Co-Chairman’s Summary of the Informal Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework for the UN’s 
Environmental Activities (New York, 27 June 2006) available online at: 
http://www.environmentalgovernance.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/reform_docs/GA_informal_plenary.pdf   
and the Informal Consultative Process on the Institutional Framework for the United Nations’ Environment Activities, Co-Chairs 
Options Paper (New York, 14 June 2007) available online at: http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/follow-
up/environment/EG-OptionsPaper.PDF.  
35 Management Review of Environmental Governance within the United Nations System, prepared by Tadanori Inomata, Joint 
Inspection Unit, Geneva, 2008 (JIU/REP/2008/3). 
36 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 31 (1992) ILM 851 (in force 21 
March 1994).  
37 See for example Options for enhanced cooperation among the three Rio Conventions, Note by the Secretariat, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.19 (2 November 2004) (this paper sets out options to improve cooperation between the 
members of the Joint Liaison Group, which comprises the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity, the 1992 UNFCCC 
and the 1996 UNCCD); Options for enhanced cooperation among the biodiversity related conventions, Note the by Executive 
Secretary, UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2 (14 July 2005); Study on Improving Cooperation and synergies between the 
Secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions  UNEP/CHW.8/INF/28 (2006). 
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unleashing hidden synergies between regimes, thereby creating more effective governance 
structures.”38 Linkage and interaction operates on a number of levels and may arise as a result of 
a deliberate governance strategy or as a consequence of ecological, sociological or functional 
interdependence.    
 At the highest level all regimes and institutions are ultimately linked by the fact that they 
operate within the realm of public international law.  Oran Young describes this form of linkage 
as “embedded” and describes it as a “fact of life” which “reflect[s] and represent[s] the deep 
structure of international society.”39 Public international law implicitly underpins all interaction 
between environmental regimes and institutions and its rules and concepts – such as the law 
relating to treaties, international organisations and state responsibility – both facilitate and limit 
the extent of their interaction. 
   At the next level, linkage might be described as “functional”40 or, more prosaically, 
“overlapping.”41  This occurs where the functional problems or subject matter of the regime are 
linked or overlap in “biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms”42 and, whilst they may intersect 
with one another on a de facto basis,43 there may be minimal deliberate interaction between 
them.  The term functional linkage might appropriately describe the current relationship between 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)44 and the 1992 
UNFCCC in connection with the impacts of climate change on the oceans including coral 
bleaching and acidification.  Of course functional linkage or the identification of overlaps 
between regimes and institutions will often provide the basis for further, deliberate interaction. 
 Closely related to functional linkage is a species of interaction which has been described 
as “behavioural”45 or “interaction through commitment.”46  The behaviour or indeed the 
commitments undertaken in one regime may impact upon or influence conduct within, or indeed 
treaty obligations agreed to as part of, another regime.  Behavioural or commitment interaction 
may be mutually supportive; for example, action taken to protect individual migratory species 
under the auspices of the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species is likely to reinforce the more 
general commitments to conserve biodiversity undertaken pursuant to the 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention.  The work undertaken by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in connection with 
fisheries subsidies is similarly likely to prove supportive of the fishery management measures 
adopted by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs).47  On the other hand, this 
form of linkage may lead to conflict between institutions or regimes; the interaction between the 
WTO and environmental treaties such as CITES and the Kyoto Protocol, which permit the 
adoption of trade-related measures to support the implementation of treaty commitments, 
                                                 
38 Oren Perez, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO” 
26 (2005) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 735 at 735. 
39 Oran R. Young, “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives” 2 (1996) Global Governance 1 – 
24 at 8. 
40 Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, “Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction” in Oran R. Young, 
Leslie A. King and Heike Schroeder, Institutions and Environmental Change: Principal Finds, Applications and Research 
Frontiers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2008) 187 – 223 at 197. 
41 Oran R. Young, op cit n. 39 at 6. 
42 Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, op cit. n. 40 at 197. 
43 Oran R. Young op cit. n. 39 at 6. 
44 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 31 (1982) ILM 1261 (in force 16 November 
1994). 
45 Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, op cit. n. 40 at 204. 
46 Ibid at 202; Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, “Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interaction” in 
Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and 
Conflict among International and EU Policies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2006) 29 – 51 at 35. 
47 See Olav Schram Stokke and Claire Coffey, “Institutional Interplay and Responsible Fisheries: Combating 
Subsidies, Developing Precaution” in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global 
Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press) (2006) 127 – 155. 
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provides arguably the most high profile example of behavioural or commitment-related linkage.48  
A recent and equally controversial example is provided by the divergent approaches taken by the 
WTO and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention with respect to access to genetic resources and the 
distribution of their benefits.49  
 The categories of linkage or interaction described above arise naturally as a result of 
overlaps in function or the common use of legal tools – such as trade measures – to promote 
treaty objectives.  Other forms of interaction or linkage are pursued deliberately in order to 
better implement the objectives of a treaty or to improve international environmental 
governance.  Cognitive interaction for example “is driven by the power of knowledge and 
ideas”50 and occurs when information or ideas generated by one institution or regime impacts on 
decision-making or activities within another institution or regime;51  in essence, when regimes or 
institutions learn from one another.52  For example, the compliance mechanism developed by the 
parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was undoubtedly based on the compliance mechanism which 
was successfully operating under the auspices of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer.53  More recently, an initiative of the CCAMLR Commission54 - the 
application of its conservation measures to nationals as well as vessels – was brought to the 
attention of twenty-seven other fishery bodies at the First Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body 
Secretariats Network held in 2007 as an example of good practice.55 Whilst cognitive interaction 
may take place under the auspices of a formal institutional connection – such as the Regional 
Fishery Body Secretariats Network – it can also occur informally, outside of any particular 
institutional arrangement. 
 Beyond sharing knowledge and ideas, institutions and regimes may choose to actively 
coordinate their activities through the development of joint work programmes and/ or the 
creation of joint rules and institutions.  Sebastian Oberthür describes this form of linkage as 
“joint interplay management”56 although it is more commonly referred to as “clustering”.57  One 
of the earliest examples of such interaction occurred – and is continuing to occur – in 
connection with the protection of the North Sea.  The North Sea “regime” comprises the soft 
                                                 
48 The literature on the linkage and interaction between trade and the environment is copious.  On the topic of 
institutional linkage between the WTO and environmental regimes see: Alice Palmer, Beatrice Chaytor and Jocob 
Werksman, “Interactions between the World Trade Organisation and International Environmental Regimes” in 
Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and 
Conflict among International and EU Policies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2006) 818 – 204; Oren Perez, 
Op cit n. 38; Olav Schram Stokke, “Trade Measures and Climate Compliance: Institutional Interplay between the 
WTO and the Marrakesh Accords” 4 (2004) International Environmental Agreements: Politics Law and Economics 339 – 
357.  
49 See G. Kristin Rosendal, “The Convention on Biological Diversity: Tensions with the WTO TRIPS Agreement 
over Access to Genetic Resources and the Sharing of Benefits” in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), 
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2006) 79 – 102. 
50 Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür, op cit. n. 40 at 200. 
51 Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, op cit. n. 46 at 35.   
52 Sebastian Oberthür, “Interplay management: enhancing environmental policy integration among international 
institutions” 9 (2009) International Environmental Agreements 371 – 391 at 378.  See further Oran Y. Young, 
“Institutions and the Growth of Knowledge: Evidence from International Environmental Regimes” 4 (2004) 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 215 – 228. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Established under the 1980 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
19 (1980) ILM 837 (in force 7 April 1982). 
55 See the Report of the First Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network, Rome, 12 – 13 March 2007 (RSN-1) 
at para. 67.   
56 Sebastian Oberthür, op cit. n. 52 at 376. 
57 The concept of “clustering” has gained considerable prominence within all four review processes noted above. 
See text accompanying notes 25 – 35.  See further, Sebastian Oberthür, “Clustering of Multilateral of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations” 3 (2002) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics 317 – 340; Oran R. Young, op cit. n. 39 at 5.   
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law Ministerial Declarations adopted at periodic North Sea Conferences,58 the 1992 Convention 
on the Protection of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR)59 and EU law.  The synergy between 
these overlapping institutions with regard to the North Sea has undoubtedly contributed to the 
successful management of the region.60  More recently, joint interplay management or clustering 
as a means of developing linkages and interactions between environmental regimes and 
institutions has received significant attention.  Numerous examples of such interaction can be 
identified across a range of pollution prevention, wildlife and fishery instruments and some of 
these will be discussed in Part II of this article below.   
The final – or ultimate – level of linkage and interaction has been described by Oran R. 
Young as “institutional nesting.”61  Regimes or institutions become institutionally nested when 
they are “folded into broader institutional frameworks”.62  The most common example of 
institutional nesting occurs when protocols are adopted under the auspices of one or more 
conventions such as the UNECE 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP)63 or the UNECE 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Water Courses and International Lakes.64  The Antarctic Treaty system might also be viewed as 
an example of institutional nesting.65 
 For the purposes of this article only formal institutional linkages between MEAs will be 
explored and other forms of informal linkages and the more official connections between 
treaties, which might be described as institutional nesting, will be excluded from consideration. 
 
4. THE NATURE AND CAPACITY OF „AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS‟ 
 
“Autonomous Institutional Arrangements” is the nomenclature coined by Churchill and Ulfstein 
in their seminal article published in 2000 to describe MEA institutions as a collective.66 The 
authors assert that autonomous institutional arrangements constitute “a distinct and different 
approach to institutionalized collaboration between states, being both more informal and more 
flexible, and often innovative in relation to norm creation and compliance.”67  Although not 
                                                 
58 These are available online at: 
http://www.ospar.org/content/content.asp?menu=01310624810000_000000_000000.  
59 1992 Convention for the Protection of the North East Atlantic (OSPAR) 32 (1993) ILM 1072 (in force 25 March 
1998). 
60 Jon Birger Skjaerseth, “Protecting the Northeast Atlantic: One Problem, Three Institutions” in Sebastian 
Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict 
among International and EU Policies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2006) 103 – 125 at 103. 
61 Oran R. Young, op cit. n. 39 at 3 – 4. 
62 Ibid. 
63 1979 UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 18 (1979) ILM 1442 (in force 16 March 
1983).  Eight protocols providing for specific regulation of particular pollutants are “nested” within LRTAP. 
64   UNECE 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes, 
(in force 6 October 1996) (text available online at: http://www.unece.org/env/water/text/text.htm). The 1992 
UNECE Water Convention is supplemented by two protocols.  Most unusually, the 2003 Protocol on Civil Liability 
and Compensation for Damage Caused by Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary 
Waters (not yet in force) is also a protocol to a second, entirely separate instrument: the 1992 UNECE Convention 
on the Transboundary Effect of Industrial Accidents (31 (1992) ILM 1333 (in force 19 April 2000)).  The text of the 
2003 Protocol is available online at: http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/protocol.html.  
65 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (402 UNTS 71, in force 23 June 1961) is supplemented by the 1991 Environmental 
Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (30 (1991) ILM 1461, in force 14 January 1998).  However, three further 
closely related instruments (the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seas (11 (1972) ILM 251, in 
force 11 March 1978), the 1982 CCAMLR and the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (27 (1988) ILM 868, not in force) as well as relevant decisions and other instruments combine 
with the Treaty and its Protocol to comprise the Antarctic Treaty System.   
66 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little-noticed Phenomenon in International Law” 94 (2000) American Journal of International Law 623 - 
659. 
67 Ibid at 625. 
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strictly an international organisation,68 the composite structure of an autonomous institutional 
arrangement – which normally comprises a conference of the parties, a secretariat, scientific or 
subsidiary bodies and, more than likely, a compliance mechanism – performs functions similar to 
many international organisations.69  These functions may include the development of formal and 
informal relationships with other MEAs as well as international organisations and institutions; in 
short, a „foreign policy‟ function.70   
 Nevertheless, whilst it is undisputed that international organisations may possess treaty 
making powers,71 the extent to which autonomous institutional arrangements or, more narrowly, 
the Conference of the Parties (COP), possess international legal personality is less clear.  
Unsurprisingly no MEA has explicitly designated its institutions as international legal persons.  
However, such an express designation is not necessary under international law.72  The possession 
of international legal personality can be implied by the nature of the organisation or institution 
and its functions.  In the words of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an organisation‟s 
“members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, 
have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively 
discharged.”73  Although the ICJ was of course referring to an intergovernmental organisation – 
the United Nations – there is no obvious reason why the doctrine of implied powers cannot be 
applied to autonomous institutional arrangements.74  A significant proportion of the institutions 
established by MEAs are required by their parties to cooperate with other appropriate 
convention bodies or international environmental organisations in order to further the objectives 
of the treaty.  A typical example is provided by Article 23(4)(h) of the Convention on 
Biodiversity, which requires the conference of the parties to “contact, through the secretariat, the 
executive bodies of conventions dealing with matters covered by this Convention with a view to 
establishing appropriate forms of cooperation with them.”  Other MEAs have developed their 
foreign policy mandate through the adoption of decisions at the conference of the parties.  For 
example, the Thirteenth Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances decided to “support appropriate collaboration and synergies that may exist 
between multilateral environmental agreements, as agreed by the Parties to those agreements.”75  
The 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance76 has included a 
reference to supporting joint work plans and partnerships with other conventions in its 2009 – 
2015 Strategic Plan.77  Even those MEAs that do not expressly provide for collaboration and 
cooperation clauses will normally include a wide ranging provision that permits the COP or 
other bodies such as the secretariat to “exercise such other functions as are required for the 
                                                 
68 The terms “international organisation” and “international institution” are not definitively defined and can be used 
to describe an intergovernmental body, an international regime or even a set of norms.  See further John Duffield, 
“What are International Institutions?” 9 (2007) International Studies Review 1 – 22.  
69 See further Geir Ulfstein, “Treaty Bodies” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2007) 877 – 889. 
70 Ibid at 885. 
71 As evidenced by the adoption in 1986 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organisations or between International Organisations (reference).  On international organisations and 
international legal personality more generally see: C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the International Law of International 
Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2005), chapter 3; Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s 
Law of International Institutions (London: Sweet and Maxwell) (2001), chapter 15; Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. 
Blokker, International Institutional Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (2001) chapter 12; N. D. White, The 
Law of International Organisations (Manchester: Manchester University Press) (1996), chapter 2. 
72 N. D. White, Ibid, at 27. 
73 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. (1949) at 179. 
74 This conclusion is supported by Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, op cit. n. 66 at 886. 
75 Decision XIII/29 Recognising the preparations for the world summit on sustainable development 2002, para. 3. 
76 1971 Convention on wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar), 11 (1972) ILM 963 (in force 21 December 
1975). 
77 Resolution X.1 (The Ramsar Strategic Plan, 2009 – 2015), Strategy 3.1. 
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achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under 
the Convention.”78  Consequently, it can be concluded that to the extent that it is necessary to 
carry out the functions of the MEA, autonomous institutional arrangements, acting collectively 
or individually have been implicitly endowed with legal personality and capacity by their 
contracting parties.79  In many if not most cases that personality extends to include the capacity 
to enter into treaties and other agreements.  These powers are though inevitably limited by the 
nature and functions of the MEA and, in many (if not all) cases, are restricted to collaboration 
with other MEAs, international institutions (such as UNEP or GEF) and scientific, technical or 
other non-governmental organisations.    
 
 
PART II 
 
5. CASE STUDIES ON COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AND AMONG 
MEAS 
 
The creation of formal linkages and institutional cooperative arrangements between MEAs has 
been identified as one mechanism for addressing the challenges presented by the globalisation 
and fragmentation of international law and partnerships between MEAs “have become an 
important element in the organizational landscape of environmental governance.”80  The extent 
to which MEAs develop formal links and cooperative institutional arrangements depends in part 
upon their legal capacity to do so and in part upon the enthusiasm and willingness of their 
institutions acting individually or collectively.  In practice the success or otherwise of these 
arrangements often comes down to the role played by the MEA secretariat.81  Increasingly, 
secretariats are regarded as “actors in their own right”,82 capable of driving a normative agenda.  
In a recent study on environmental bureaucracies, significant differences in the perceived and 
actual influence of individual secretariats over the direction and operation of their respective 
MEAs were identified.83  For example, the secretariats to the 1992 Biodiversity Convention and 
                                                 
78 Although this text was taken from Article 7(m) of the 1992 UNFCCC, it is typical of the vast majority of MEAs. 
79 This conclusion would appear to be supported by the opinion of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, which in 1993 
asserted that the UNFCCC established "an international entity/ organization with its own separate legal personality, 
statement of principles, organs and a supportive structure in the form of a Secretariat (Articles 3, 7-10)."  The 
Opinion went on to note that the UNFCCC had capacity to establish cooperative arrangements with other 
competent international organisations and bodies.  See United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Arrangements for 
the Implementation of the Provisions of Article 11 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Concerning the Financial Mechanism, para. 4 (Nov. 4, 1993) and UN Doc. A/AC.237/50 (1993) cited in Robin 
Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, op cit. n. 66 at 647 – 648 and at footnotes 156 and 158. 
80 Liliana B. Andonova, “International organisations as entrepreneurs of environmental partnerships” in Frank 
Bierman, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyögg, International Organisations in Global Environmental Governance 
(London: Routledge) (2009) 195 – 222 at 220. 
81 It should be noted that the legal basis and structure of secretariats can be divided into four broad categories.  
First, secretariats which are provided by a UN body, such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which 
administers 50 instruments relating to shipping safety and marine environmental protection or the United Nations 
Education, Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) which administers the 1972 Convention for the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (11 (1972) ILM 1294, in force 17 December 1975).  Second, secretariats 
which are administered by UNEP.  UNEP provides the secretariat for nine global conventions and protocols and 
eight regional conventions and protocols including the 1973 CITES, the 1989 Basel Convention and the 1979 CMS.  
Third, secretariats which are institutionally linked with UNEP but which operate independently of it such as the1992 
UNFCCC and the 1996 UNCCD.  Finally, there are those secretariats that operate entirely independently of the UN 
such as those that administer the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1992 OSPAR Convention. 
82 Steffan Bauer, Per-Olf Busch and Bernd Siebenhüner, “Treaty Secretariats in Global Environmental Governance” 
in Frank Bierman, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyögg, International Organisations in Global Environmental 
Governance (London: Routledge) (2009) 174 – 191 at 174. 
83 Frank Bierman and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds), Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental 
Bureaucracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2009).  See in particular chapters 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
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the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)84 were both viewed 
as dynamic institutions able to exercise “significant influence on international negotiations and 
cooperation”85 and “significant normative influence in the convention process.”86  By contrast, 
the secretariat to the 1992 UNFCCC was perceived as operating within a straitjacket imposed by 
the parties to the Convention leaving little room for a “proactive role or [for] autonomous 
initiatives.”87 
Unsurprisingly, those MEAs benefiting from a more dynamic secretariat such as the 1992 
Biodiversity Convention would appear to have engaged to a much greater extent in fostering 
institutional cooperation between MEAs, as will be demonstrated below.  Although the linkages 
and examples of institutional interaction between MEAs are now numerous, this article will 
focus primarily on the formal linkages between MEAs and MEA institutions.  Moreover, only 
three categories of institutional linkage will be explored.  The first category comprises the formal 
agreements often referred to as Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between MEAs.  The 
second category consists of three examples of institutional integrated management; cooperative 
arrangements that go beyond the typical MOU but do not yet amount to full legal or nested 
arrangements.  In the third category the focus will be on the connections and linkages that are 
being developed by MEA compliance mechanisms or in the more general context of compliance. 
  
 
a) Formal Agreements and other Cooperative Arrangements Facilitating Institutional 
Cooperation 
 
Concluding a formal agreement or MOU with one or more other MEAs provides a clear external 
demonstration of linkage between those MEAs.  An ever increasing number of MEAs are 
adopting formal agreements with a growing number of partners.  For example, the 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity has concluded 134 agreements to date with partners that include 
international organisations, universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), botanical 
gardens and eighteen other MEAs.  The 1973 CITES has concluded a rather more modest 
fourteen partnership agreements, four of which are with other MEAs.  However, this trend is 
not ubiquitous; the 1959 Antarctic Treaty for example, has entered into no official partnership 
agreements.  Moreover, partnership agreements vary considerably in their objects and purposes; 
some are intended to provide for little more than the exchange of information and to facilitate 
the mutual exchange of observers at meetings whereas others establish joint work programmes 
and create liaison positions.  What has yet to be definitively determined is whether these 
agreements are legally binding or whether they are entirely political or administrative in nature.  
Whilst a minority of agreements expressly state that they are not intended to be legally binding88 
the vast majority are silent as to their status.  Whilst some commentators take the view that 
MOUs can never be legally binding,89 others suggest that they only tend to be legally non-
                                                 
84 1994 Convention to Combat Desertification, 33 (1994) ILM 1016 (in force 26 December 1996). 
85 Bernd Siebenhüner, “The Biodiversity Secretariat: Lean Shark in Troubled Waters” in Frank Bierman and Bernd 
Siebenhüner (eds), op cit. n. 83, 265 – 291 at 284. 
86 Steffan Bauer, “The Desertification Secretariat: A Castle Made of Sand” in Frank Bierman and Bernd Siebenhüner 
(eds), op cit. n. 81, 293 – 317 at 300. 
87 Per-Olf Busch, “The Climate Secretariat: Making a Living in a Straitjacket” in Frank Bierman and Bernd 
Siebenhüner (eds), op cit. n. 83, 245 – 244 at 251 and 261. 
88 The MOU between the 1982 CCAMLR and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 
which entered into force in January 2009 expressly states that it does not contain legally binding commitments.  The 
MOU is reproduced in Annex 6 of the Report of the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the CCAMLR Commission (2008).  
Similarly, the proposed MOU between CCAMLR and the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and 
Petrels (ACAP) is also expressly intended to be non-binding.  The text of the proposed MOU is reproduced in 
Annex 8 of the Report of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the CCAMLR Commission (2009). 
89
 Rüdger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Berlin: Springer) (2003) at 173. 
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binding.90  In fact, the focus on the term “MOU” is rather misleading.  Not all agreements 
between MEAs are described as MOUs.  For example, a number of the agreements between the 
1992 Biodiversity Convention and other MEAs are described as “memorandum of cooperation 
(MOC)” and the 1971 Ramsar Convention uses the nomenclature of “cooperative agreement” in 
addition to both MOU and MOC.  The title of the agreement is thus of limited assistance in 
determining its legal status.  Moreover, a significant proportion of agreements between MEAs 
contain what arguably amount to formal obligations in connection with information exchange or 
participation in joint activities as well as detailed provisions relating to duration, modification and 
termination of the agreement.  In at least two cases, the agreement includes a formal a dispute 
settlement clause91 and two further agreements appear to include a clause which purports to limit 
the liability and agency capacity of each MEA.92  To the untrained – and indeed the trained – eye 
many such agreements appear to wear (if not flaunt) some of the trappings of a legally binding 
instrument.  Nevertheless, even if they are to be considered binding the extent of their legal 
obligations is likely to reach no further than the institutions of the MEA including – possibly – 
the COP.  Such agreements are unlikely to bind individual states party to the relevant MEA in 
the absence of an express provision to the contrary. 
 The agreements highlighted below to demonstrate the nature and extent of institutional 
linkage and formal cooperation among MEAs represent only a snapshot of the hundreds of 
agreements which have been entered into to date.  It is not intended – and indeed it is not 
possible within the confines of this article – to provide a comprehensive overview of these 
agreements.93  Instead, a small number of agreements, which have been divided into three 
categories on the basis of their objects and purposes, will be explored in order to demonstrate 
the possibilities and indeed the limitations of these agreements as a mechanism for managing the 
challenges of globalisation and fragmentation within international environmental law.  
 
i. Agreements and other Cooperative Arrangements Based on Overlapping Subject 
Matter 
 
The largest category comprises formal agreements or other cooperative arrangements based on 
synergies or overlaps in subject matter.  As noted above, the most active MEA in the adoption 
of agreements and the creation of cooperative arrangements is the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.  
The secretariat to the CBD is provided with an extensive mandate to establish appropriate forms 
of cooperation under Article 23(4) of the Convention and this role has been reinforced in a 
number of decisions adopted under the Convention94 and in the Strategic Plan for the 
                                                 
90
 Geir Ulfstein, “Treaty Bodies” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2007) at 887. 
91 The 2004 Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between the 1992 Biodiversity Convention and the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organisation on Cooperation between the CBD and the Secretariat of the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) and the 2009 MOC between the CBD and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP) both include dispute resolution clauses. 
92 Article 3(A) of the 2005 MOC between the CBD and the Ramsar Convention stipulates that “this MOC 
constitutes an expression of a shared objective and vision.  However, each party‟s actions will be considered to be 
that party‟s sole and separate action, for all purposes, and neither party shall claim to be acting on behalf of, or as 
agent for, the other party to this MOC.”  Similarly the 2002 MOU between the Secretariat of CITES and the 
Secretariat of the CMS stipulates that “neither secretariat shall be legally or financially liable in any way for activities 
carried out jointly or independently” (Article 5(c)). 
93 See Synergies and Cooperation: A Status report on activities promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, in particular biodiversity-related conventions and related mechanisms, prepared by the UNEP World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, UK, May 2004. 
94 See Decision II/13 Cooperation with other biodiversity related conventions; Decision IV/15 The relationship of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity with the Commission on Sustainable Development and biodiversity related conventions, other international 
agreements and processes of relevance; Decision VI/20 Cooperation with other organizations, initiatives and conventions; Decision 
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Convention on Biological Diversity.95  The Biodiversity Convention has entered into formal 
cooperative arrangements with: the 1991 Alpine Convention96 and 2003 Carpathian Convention97 
(2008); the 1979 Bern Convention98 (2001, revised in 2008); the 1983 Cartagena (Caribbean Seas) 
Convention99 (1997); 1973 CITES (1996, revised in 2001); the 1979 Convention on Migratory 
Species (1996); the 1994 UNCCD (1998); the 1951 International Plant Protection Convention100 
(2004); the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) (2009); and 
the 1971 Ramsar Convention (1996, revised in 2005).101  The CBD has also entered into a 
multiagency agreement with five other biodiversity instruments and this will be the subject of 
discussion below.102   
The majority of these agreements are similar in scope, extent and format.  They all 
provide for obligations related to information exchange, normally through utilisation of the CBD 
Clearing House; for mutual participation at relevant meetings; and for the development of joint 
work programmes.  All agreements provide for clauses governing the duration, modification and 
termination of agreements.  One agreement – the 1998 MOC between the 1992 CBD and the 
1996 UNCCD – is notable in that it goes well beyond the scope of the other agreements in terms 
of its content.  For example, it requires the parties to begin the process of developing a 
harmonised approach to reporting, and encourages further integration of their respective 
secretariats.  Moreover, the MOC recommends that the parties explore mechanisms to enhance 
links and processes in New York and other UN centres in order to provide appropriate 
representation at relevant meetings.  Other proposals contained within the MOC include the 
establishment of two liaison staff in New York that are employed by the UNCCD but report to 
both Conventions and the creation of a closed list forum to improve interaction and exchange of 
information among the secretariats.  As noted above, a recent study of international 
environmental bureaucracies concluded that both the CBD Secretariat and, more particularly, the 
UNCCD Secretariat were dynamic and influential actors in their own right103 and it is highly 
likely that the exceptional scope of this particular agreement is a result of the dynamic nature of 
both institutions. 
The cooperative agreements entered into by other MEAs such as the 1973 CITES, the 
1971 Ramsar Convention and the 1979 CMS Convention are all expressed in terms similar to 
those described above.  The 1971 Ramsar Convention in particular has developed extensive 
                                                                                                                                                        
VII/26 Cooperation with other conventions, international organisations and initiatives; Decision IX/27 Cooperation among 
multilateral environmental agreements and other organisations.  In addition there are a further 58 decisions on substantive 
topics that call for cooperation between the CBD and other biodiversity-focused MEAs.  They are all available 
online at: http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/decisions.shtml.  
95 Decision VI/26 Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity, Goals 1.2 and 4.4. 
96 1991 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Alps (in force 1995).  Text available online at: 
http://www.alpconv.org/theconvention/index_en.  
97 2003 Framework Convention for the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Carpathians (in force 2006).  
Text available online at: http://www.carpathianconvention.org/text.htm.  
98 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern), UKTS 56 (1982) Cmnd. 
8738 (in force 1 June 1982).  
99 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region, 22 (1983) ILM 221 (in force 11 October 1986). 
100 1951 International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) (text revised, 1997).  Revised text available online at: 
https://www.ippc.int/file_uploaded//publications/13742.New_Revised_Text_of_the_International_Plant_Protecti
o.pdf  
101 The text of all of these cooperative agreements are available online at: http://www.cbd.int/agreements/.  
102 See text accompanying notes 136 – 152 below. 
103 See the references cited in notes 85 – 86 above. 
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institutional links with twenty-one MEAs104 and the importance of partnership agreements and 
joint work plans was endorsed in the recently adopted Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015.105  
Similarly, seven of the thirty CMS partners are MEAs and close cooperation “with relevant 
multilateral environmental agreement and key partners to maximise synergies and avoid 
duplication” is a key component of the CMS Strategic Plan 2006 – 2011.106  The consolidation of 
existing partnerships – rather than the adoption of new ones – through the development of 
renewable joint work programmes is an identified key priority area for the CMS.107  The 1973 
CITES has entered into fewer partnership agreements and only two have been concluded with 
MEAs on the basis of overlapping subject matter: with the CBD (1996)108 and the CMS (2002).109  
Notably the CITES / CMS MOU was reaffirmed by CITES Resolution Conf.13.3 (2004) in 
which the parties directly requested that CITES initiatives should support the regional 
collaborative activities on-going under the auspices of the CMS in respect of the saiga antelope, 
marine turtles, the great white shark, whale sharks and sturgeons.110  Nevertheless, the conclusion 
of partnership arrangements with suitable MEA and other organisations has been included as a 
central component of the CITES Strategic Vision 2008 – 2013.111  
The adoption of partnership agreements is not exclusively the preserve of biodiversity 
MEAs although these conventions undeniably dominate this category of cooperative 
arrangements.  In 2006 the conferences of the parties to the Basel,112 Stockholm113 and 
Rotterdam114 Conventions all adopted decisions establishing a joint working group with the task 
of making recommendations for the improved cooperation and coordination between these 
instruments in the area of chemicals and hazardous waste management.115  This process began 
what is arguably evolving into the most successful cooperative arrangement to date, which will 
be discussed further below.  Similarly, regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) are 
establishing institutional cooperative links for the primary purpose of exchanging information 
and knowledge.  For example, the 1982 CCAMLR Commission has recently adopted an MOU 
with the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
                                                 
104 The full list of Ramsar partners are available online at: http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-
mous/main/ramsar/1-31-115_4000_0__.  
105 Resolution X.1 The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015, strategy 3.1. 
106 Resolution 8.2 (2002) CMS Strategic Plan 2006 – 2011, operational principle 2.  
107 Resolution 9.6 (2008) Cooperation with other bodies.  See also Resolution 7.9 (2002) Cooperation with other bodies and 
processes and Resolution 8.11 (2005) Cooperation with other Conventions.  An overview of the CMS cooperative 
arrangements is provided in UNEP/CMS/Conf.9.23 (5 November 2008) Report on CMS Activities with Partners. 
108 Memorandum of Cooperation between the Secretariat of CITES and the Secretariat of the CBD (1996) available 
online at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmt-cites-1996-03-23-moc-web-en.pdf,  
109 Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of CITES and the Secretariat of the CMS (2002) 
available online at: http://www.cites.org/common/disc/sec/CITES-CMS.pdf.  
110 Resolution 13.3 (2004) Cooperation and Synergy with the CMS. 
111 Resolution Conf. 14.2 (2007) Strategic Vision 2008 – 2013, objectives 3.3 and 3.5. 
112 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel 
Convention) 28 (1989) ILM 657 (in force 24 May 1992). 
113 2001 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm) 40 (2001) ILM 532 (in force 17 May 2004).  
114 1998 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade (Rotterdam), 38 (1999) ILM 1 (in force 24 February 2004). 
115 See Decision VIII/8 Cooperation and coordination between the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (2006) adopted 
by the Basel Conference of Parties; Decision SC-2/15 Synergies (2006) adopted by the Stockholm Conference of 
Parties; and Decision RC-3-8 Cooperation and Coordination between the Rotterdam, Basel and Stockholm Conventions adopted 
by the Rotterdam Conference of Parties. 
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the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC)116 and has agreed the text for an MOU with 
the secretariat of the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP).117  One 
of the most extensive cooperative institutional networks is the Regional Fishery Body 
Secretariats Network (RSN) created in 2005.118  This is an informal network of up to thirty-five 
fishery secretariats, which focuses on information exchange and administration.  It has no 
decision-making powers and it has been expressly recognised that the policy-making function 
and mandate essentially rests with the members of the organisation represented.119  The informal 
network met in 2007120 and 2009121 and provided a forum for fishery secretariats to exchange 
information, experiences and ideas connected with all aspects of fishing but with particular 
emphasis on IUU fishing; a model example of cognitive interaction. 
Finally, it is worth noting that some MEAs have recognised the importance of 
cooperation with other MEAs and have taken unilateral formal steps to promote such 
cooperation through the adoption of formal decisions or resolutions.  For example, the 
conference of the parties to the 1989 Basel Convention has adopted a number of decisions 
emphasising the close relationship in terms of subject matter between itself and the IMO.122  In 
particular, Decision IX/12 (2008) requested that the Secretariat to the Basel Convention keep 
the IMO informed in connection with relevant developments taking place under the auspices of 
the Convention; encouraged cooperation between the IMO and the Basel Secretariat with 
especial reference to the implementation of MARPOL 73/78;123 and asked the open-ended 
working group to develop recommendations designed to identify and address gaps not covered 
by either the Basel Convention or IMO conventions.  More specifically, Decision IX/30 also 
adopted in 2008 addressed the relationship between the Basel Convention and the IMO in the 
context of ship dismantling, and made detailed recommendations to the IMO on matters of 
substance, as well as suggestions as to the process of consultation and collaboration.124  A similar 
approach has been taken by the parties to the Antarctic Treaty in respect of their interaction with 
the IMO.  Whilst in the past the Antarctic Treaty has deliberately avoided direct institutional 
interaction with MEAs and other institutions outside of the Antarctic Treaty system, issues such 
                                                 
116 The MOU entered into force in January 2009 and the text of the MOU is reproduced in Annex 6 of the Report of 
the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the CCAMLR Commission (2008). 
117 The text of the proposed MOU is reproduced in Annex 8 of the Report of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the CCAMLR 
Commission (2009). 
118 The RSN replaces the FAO Regional Fisheries Bodies Group which was established in 1999 and the change of 
name was agreed in 205.  See the Report of the Fourth Meeting of Regional Fishery Bodies, Rome, 14 – 15 March 2005 at 
paras. 5 and 7. 
119 Ibid at para. 5. 
120 See the Report of the First Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network, Rome, 12 – 13 March 2007 (RSN-1). 
121 See the Report of the Second Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats Network, Rome, 9 – 10 March 2007 (RSN-
2). 
122 See Decision VIII/9 Cooperation between the Basel Convention and the International Maritime Organization (2006); 
Decision IX/12 Cooperation between the Basel Convention and the International Maritime Organization (2008).  See more 
generally, Decision VIII/7 International cooperation and coordination (2006); Decision IX/11 International Cooperation and 
Coordination (2008) 
123 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL) 12 (1973) ILM 1319 amended by 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto before entry into force (in force 2 October 1983). 
124 Decision IX/30 Dismantling of Ships (2008).  The IMO, Basel Convention and International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) participated in three joint meetings between 2005 and 2008 of the working group on ship scrapping (see the 
following documents: ILO/IMO/BC WG 1/8 (18 February 2005); ILO/IMO/BC WG 2/11 (14 December 2005); 
ILO/IMO/BC WG 3/6 (31 October 2008)).  Resolution 2 adopted at the conclusion of the 2009 International 
Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships acknowledged the contribution of the ILO 
and the Basel Convention to the development of the Convention.  
Third Four Societies Conference, 26 – 28 August 2010, International Law in the New Era of Globalization  
Draft Paper: Conflation of and Conflict between Regulatory Mandates in International Environmental Law, Karen Scott  
 
17 
 
as the ban on the use and carriage of heavy grade fuels by vessels and the development of the 
Polar Code, has made cooperation with the IMO not only desirable but inevitable.125  In 
response to what essentially amounts to a globalisation of Antarctic issues, the parties to the 
1959 Antarctic Treaty adopted in 2010, Resolution 5, which establishes a system of responsibility 
and procedure for keeping the parties informed of the progress of Antarctic initiatives within the 
IMO.126  
 
ii. Agreements and other Cooperative Arrangements Based on Intersecting Subject 
Matter 
 
In contrast to the cooperative agreements between MEAs on the basis of overlapping subject 
matter the number of agreements based on intersecting subject matter is much smaller.  The 
most high profile example of such an agreement is the Joint Liaison Group (JLG), which was 
formed in 2001 between the secretariats of the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity, the 1992 
UNFCCC and the 1996 UNCCD.127 The JLG was established as an informal forum for the 
exchange of information and to facilitate the development of options for further cooperation.  
The group has met nine times since 2001 and has developed joint work programmes on forests 
and on the biodiversity of dry and sub-humid lands.128  However, its capacity to take policy 
decisions is limited.  Moreover, at the ninth meeting of the JLG in 2009 it was noted that “there 
remains a disconnect between the roles and mandates given to the JLG by each convention with 
this disconnect resulting in limitations when considering the implementation of the requested 
activities.”129  In particular, it was pointed out that only those activities that are mandated by the 
governing body of each convention could be implemented by the JLG.130  This disconnect may 
result – at least in part – from the fact that these three instruments have quite different aims and 
objectives and although their subject matter intersects it does not necessarily overlap.  
 
iii. Agreements and other Cooperative Arrangements Based on Functional Synergy 
The final category of cooperative arrangements exploits synergies in function rather than subject 
matter.  The term function is used here to refer to the tools and mechanisms used by an MEA to 
achieve its objects and purposes.  Functions might include regulating trade in the subject matter 
of the treaty, establishing catch limits, licensing vessels or other users such as importers and 
exporters.  It is of course not always possible to draw a distinction between function and subject 
matter; the networks and other cooperative arrangements between RFMOs for example exploit 
                                                 
125 Karen N. Scott, “Safety of Shipping in the Southern Ocean” 16 (2010) Journal of International Maritime Law 21 – 44 
at 43 – 44. 
126 Resolution 5 (2010) Co-ordination among Antarctic Treaty Parties on Antarctic Proposals under Consideration in the IMO.  
The Resolution recommends that when a party or group of parties has initiated a proposal that results in a referral to 
the IMO that initiating party is responsible for reporting to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) and 
intersessionally on the progress of that proposal within the IMO.  That party is also responsible for informing the 
ATCM when further action may need to be considered in order to further the objectives of the ATCM. 
127 See Decision 13.8 Cooperation with other conventions (2002) adopted by the conference of the parties to the 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity. 
128 Further details are provided online at: http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/activities.shtml.  
129 Report of the Meeting of the Joint Liaison Group of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 14 May 2009 at para 
11. 
130 Ibid. 
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commonalties in function – utilisation of catch limits, licensing requirements, catch 
documentation schemes etc. – as well as subject matter: fish.  Similarly, the cooperative 
arrangement developed by the Basel, Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions noted above and 
to be discussed further below might also be categorised as a functional arrangement 
notwithstanding the close connection between the subject matter of each regime.  This 
conclusion would appear to be supported by the adoption of the Prague Declaration on 
enhancing cooperation among chemical-related multilateral environmental agreements by the 
parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances in 2004.  Amongst other 
things, in this Declaration, the parties affirmed their commitment to seeking alliances with other 
multilateral instruments like the Basel, Stockholm and Rotterdam conventions “to contribute to 
an effective strategic approach to international chemicals management.”131  
However, a small number of cooperative agreements have been adopted by MEAs with 
very different objects and purposes but which demonstrate significant functional similarities.  
The most obvious example of such an agreement is the 2002 MOU among the Secretariats of 
the 1973 CITES, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and 
the 1989 Basel Convention.132  This MOU seeks to capitalise on the synergies in functions 
between these very different instruments – they all to a greater or lesser extent seek to regulate 
trade in, transport and transfer of (respectively) wildlife, ozone depleting substances and 
hazardous waste – in order to improve compliance with all three instruments.  The MOU 
provides for the exchange of information, mutual observation of meetings, joint training 
(particularly for customs officers, the police and the judiciary) and sharing techniques relating to 
gathering and analysing information.  The MOU permits each secretariat to seek information 
held in the databases maintained by each of the other Conventions but requires the consent of 
the relevant secretariat before that information can be released.  Finally, the MOU requires that 
each secretariat must nominate a liaison person responsible for implementing the MOU.133  The 
purpose of this arrangement is primarily cognitive interaction; each regime learns from the 
experiences and initiatives of the other with a view to improving the effectiveness of all three 
regimes. 
b) Institutional Integrated Management 
 
The second category of institutional cooperation comprises what is described here as 
institutional integrated management.  Examples of cooperation within this category go beyond 
what is required by the standard MOU.  Institutional integrated management requires institutions 
to engage in broader and deeper cooperative activities.  Three examples are identified in order to 
demonstrate institutional integrated management: the biodiversity liaison group (BLG); the Kobe 
process and joint activities of the tuna RFMOs; and the 2010 extraordinary meeting of the 
chemicals conventions. 
 
i. The Biodiversity Liaison Group  
                                                 
131 Prague Declaration on enhancing cooperation among chemicals-related multilateral environmental agreements (2004) reproduced in 
Annex V of the Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 22 – 26 November 2004.  The 
synergies and need to continue cooperation between the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention were recently 
noted at the Twenty-first meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol in 2009.  See the Report of the Twenty-first 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 4 – 8 November 2008 at para. 207. 
132 Text available online at: http://www.cites.org/common/disc/sec/CITES-BASEL-OZONE.pdf.  
133 Ibid. 
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The Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) was an initiative of the conference of parties to the 1992 
Biodiversity Convention in 2004. Decision VII/26 urged “further enhanced cooperation 
between the Convention on Biological Diversity and all relevant international conventions” and 
requested that the Executive Secretary “invite the secretariats of the other four biodiversity 
conventions (CITES, Ramsar, CMS and the World Heritage Convention) for form a liaison 
group to enhance coherence and cooperation in their implementation.”134 The liaison group was 
formalised in 2006 with the adoption of the Memorandum of Cooperation between Agencies to 
Support the Achievement of the 2010 Biodiversity Target135 and expanded to include a sixth 
member; the secretariat of the 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture.136 The BLG normally meets annually at chief Officers level137 and meetings are 
convened by the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.138  The BLG has identified two priority areas of 
focus which comprise the 2010 Biodiversity Target and the Global Partnership on 
Biodiversity.139  Overall, the achievements of the BLG are thus far rather modest.  The focus to 
date has largely been confined to integrating the activities of all six biodiversity conventions into 
current initiatives rather than developing new projects or programmes.  For example, the BLG 
agreed in 2005 to adopt biodiversity indicators for all five biodiversity conventions that are 
consistent with the framework of goals and targets adopted by the CBD in 2004140 in order to 
promote coherence among the conventions in both policy development and implementation.141 
The most tangible outcome of the BLG to date is the development of an interactive CD-Rom on 
the application of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity142 within all six biodiversity conventions.  This project was initiated in 2006143 and 
completed in 2008.  The CD-ROM contains all relevant decisions adopted by the six 
conventions connected to the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines and, most importantly, 
includes guidelines agreed jointly by all six conventions for each principle.144 
Although the focus on strengthening participation in existing projects is hardly surprising 
given the large number of joint and other collaborative programmes that are currently underway 
involving all conventions, the lack of progress in other areas is disappointing.  Whilst the six 
conventions have established a joint website145 there is little evidence of further administrative 
integration.  This is despite the fact that ideas for closer cooperation – such as harmonised 
reporting, joint representation at non-biodiversity meetings and joint missions – have been 
discussed on a regular basis at meetings.146  One obstacle to further integration at the 
international level appears to be the fact that the national focal points for each convention are 
often in different government departments, which makes coherent implementation a 
                                                 
134 Decision VII/26 Cooperation with other conventions and international organisations and initiatives (2004), paras. 1 and 2.  
The mandate of the BLG was renewed in Decision IX/27 Cooperation among multilateral environmental agreements and 
other organizations (2008). 
135 Text of the 2006 MOC is available online at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/agreements/agmt-hoatf-cites-2006-10-15-
moc-web-en.pdf.  
136 2001 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (in force 29 June 2004).  Text 
available online at: http://www.planttreaty.org/texts_en.htm.  
137 It should be noted that no meeting took place in 2007. 
138 This was agreed at the second meeting of the BLG held on 16 August 2004. 
139 This was also agreed at the second meeting of the BLG. 
140 See CBD Decision VII/30 Strategic Plan: future evaluation of progress (2004). 
141 See the Third Meeting Final Report, 10 May 2005 at para. 16.  For further information on the Biodiversity Indicators 
Partnership (which extends beyond the six biodiversity conventions) see: http://www.twentyten.net/.  
142 See CBD Decision VII/12 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for Sustainable Use (2004). 
143 See the Fifth Meeting Final Report, 14 September 2006 at paras 20 – 24. 
144 The contents of the CD are also available to download at: http://www.cbd.int/doc/programmes/socio-
eco/use/aagp/AAGP.zip.  
145 At: http://www.cbd.int/blg/.  
146 See the Third Meeting Final Report, 10 May 2005 at paras. 19 – 21 and the Seventh Meeting Final Report, 1 May 2009 at 
paras. 47 and 48. 
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challenge.147  Moreover, there is also evidence of a level of tension within the BLG between the 
six biodiversity conventions resulting from differences in priorities and resources.  For example, 
at the Fifth Meeting in 2006 the representative for CITES “recalled that the 2010 biodiversity 
target was agreed within the CBD without prior consultation with other processes.  He said that 
the 2010 biodiversity target as well as the process to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) were not central objectives in CITES implementation and that the CITES constituency 
was only beginning to take these on board.”148  Similarly, at the Sixth Meeting held in 2008 
representatives of both CITES and the World Heritage Organisation indicated that it was 
difficult if not impossible to provide resources for the preparation of the third edition of the 
Global Biodiversity Outlook.149  Most significantly, there appears to be no vision to take the BLG 
beyond the 2010 Biodiversity Target.  It is likely that a post 2010 vision will be agreed by the 
CBD conference of the parties at its tenth meeting, which is due to be held in Nagoya, Japan in 
October 2010.  However, it is disappointing that the six biodiversity conventions as a collective 
have taken so few steps to – at the very least – develop a proposed mandate to extend its 
operation meaningfully beyond 2010.150 
 
ii. Cooperation between Tuna RFMOs and the Kobe Process 
 
A rather more successful example of integrated institutional management is demonstrated by the 
cooperative arrangement entered into by the five tuna RFMOs as part of the so-called Kobe 
process.  Although informal cooperation between the RFMOs has occurred since 1999, Japan, in 
2005, proposed that the five tuna RFMOs – the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC); the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC); the Western and Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCFPC); and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) – 
convene a joint meeting.  The first meeting was held in Kobe in 2007 and this was followed by a 
Chair‟s meeting in San Francisco in 2008 and a second meeting of the RFMOs was held in San 
Sebastian in 2009.  Whilst an important function of the joint meetings is to provide a forum 
within which to share information, knowledge and experiences – the essentials of cognitive 
interaction – the primary objective is to “go beyond reinforcing current work of the RFMOs 
and... to address issues at a global level where the work of the individual RFMOs is not 
sufficient.”151 The Kobe process thus attempts to address the inherent structural weakness in 
tuna fisheries management: that whilst “vessels move globally from one resource to another... 
tuna stocks are managed by organisations that are „regional‟ by definition.”152 
 Although only three years into the Kobe process, the five RFMOs acting collectively 
have made significant progress towards institutional integrated management.  A joint website has 
been established153 and the five RFMOs have agreed to allow access to their IUU vessel lists and 
licensed vessel lists centrally on this website.154  Furthermore, the five RFMOs have agreed that 
their performance should be reviewed in accordance with a common methodology and that the 
                                                 
147 See the Fifth Meeting Report, 14 September 2006 at para. 1. 
148 See the Fifth Meeting Final Report, 14 September 2006 at para. 11.  
149 See the Sixth Meeting Report, 31 May 2008 at paras 16 – 20. 
150 The BLG and the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of the Biodiversity-related Conventions (CSAB) held a 
combined meeting in Paris on 20 January 2010.  However, this was not a formal meeting but rather an exchange to 
coordinate activities amongst conventions for the International Year for Biodiversity.  No formal report of the 
meeting has been issued. 
151 This is the third principle identified by the Chair of the second meeting.  See the Report of the Second Joint Meeting of 
Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, 29 June – 3 July 2009. 
152 Opening statement made by Toshiro Shirasu, Director General of the Fisheries Agency of Japan at the first joint 
meeting.  See the Report of the Joint Meeting of the Tuna RFMOs, Kobe, Japan, January 22 – 26 2007. 
153 The website is found at: http://www.tuna-org.org/.  
154 This was agreed at the first joint meeting which took place in Kobe in 2007.  It should be noted that the CCSBT 
does not maintain an IUU vessel list that is publicly accessible. 
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review reports should be made available collectively on the joint website.155  Moreover, the 
RFMOs have developed the so-called “Kobe Chart” which is designed standardise the 
presentation of stock assessments and to facilitate the adoption of management decisions on the 
basis of best scientific advice.156  All five tuna RFMOs are now using the Kobe Chart157 and the 
RFMOs have begun the process of developing a “strategy matrix” for managers which will 
identify common options for meeting management targets including the options of ending 
overfishing and rebuilding depleted stocks.158  Compliance issues and the management of Illegal 
Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing have dominated discussions at both meetings as well 
as the Chairs‟ meeting which took place in 2008.159  Various options for improving compliance 
through collaborative measures have been explored including the development of harmonised 
criteria for the listing and delisting of IUU vessels160 and the adoption of centralised and 
integrated compliance measures.161  
 The progress of the tuna RFMOs through the Kobe process towards integrated 
institutional management compares favourably with the progress (or lack thereof) of the 
Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) discussed above.  However, it must be acknowledged that the 
tuna RFMOs, in contrast to the six biodiversity conventions that comprise the BLG, benefit 
from similar if not identical objects and purposes and very similar mandates for the management 
of tuna stocks.   Nevertheless, the question of how to progress the Kobe process is as pertinent 
to the five tuna RFMOs as is the question of how to progress the BLG to the six biodiversity 
conventions.  At the second meeting of the tuna RFMOs held in San Sebastian in 2009 the 
possibility of holding a Ministerial meeting in conjunction with the third meeting (Kobe III) was 
discussed.  While some participants were of the view that holding a simultaneous Ministerial 
meeting would provide necessary additional political will to implement the Kobe process others 
preferred to maintain the Kobe process outside the political framework.  No consensus was 
reached on the proposal.162    
 
iii. The 2010 Extraordinary Meeting of the Chemicals Conventions 
 
The final and most extensive example of integrated institutional management to date resulted in 
the 2010 extraordinary meeting of the Basel, Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions.  This is the 
first simultaneous meeting of autonomous MEAs at the global level163 and provides the most 
visible demonstration of the evolving close cooperative arrangement between these three 
conventions.  The origins of the Extraordinary Meeting and the broader cooperative initiatives 
developed by these MEAs can be found in decisions taken by all three conferences of the parties 
                                                 
155 This was agreed at the first joint meeting which took place in Kobe in 2007. 
156 Ibid. 
157 As noted at the second joint meeting which took place in San Sebastian in 2009. 
158 As agreed at the second joint meeting Ibid.  See the attachment to Appendix I of the Report of the Second Joint 
Meeting of Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, 29 June – 3 July 2009. 
159 See the Report of the RFMOs Chairs’ Meeting, San Francisco, 5 – 6 February 2008. 
160 See the Report of the Second Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, 29 June – 3 July 2009. 
161 See the Report of the RFMOs Chairs’ Meeting, San Francisco, 5 – 6 February 2009. 
162 See the Report of the Second Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs, San Sebastian, Spain, 29 – June – 3 July 2009. 
163 At the regional level it must be noted that a joint meeting took place between the OSPAR and the Helsinki 
Commissions (with responsibility for the North East Atlantic and the Baltic Sea respectively) in 2003.  This led to a 
joint declaration (available online at: 
http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/MinisterialDeclarations/HelcomOsparMinDecl2003.pdf) and a joint work 
programme on marine protected areas (information available online at: 
http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/BremenDocs/Joint_MPA_Work_Programme.pdf).  Although a second joint 
meeting was proposed for 2010 this does not appear to be scheduled to take place although both Commissions will 
be meeting independently during 2010. 
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in 2006.164 As a result of these decisions an ad hoc joint working group was established by the 
three conventions in order to make joint recommendations on mechanisms to improve 
cooperation between the parties whilst respecting their autonomy.  The working group met three 
times between March 2007 and March 2008 and its third report165 provided the basis for the 
adoption of the so-called synergy decisions by the three MEAs in 2008.166   By virtue of these 
decisions the three conferences of the parties initiated a detailed programme of work to develop 
or explore a wide range of options for enhancing cooperation and coordination among the 
conventions.  Included among the many recommendations were proposals for developing joint 
implementation at the national level, for promoting programmatic cooperation in the field and 
for promoting the use of regional centres for supporting the implementation of all three 
conventions.  The decisions also called upon the parties to improve coordination at the 
international level through exploring options for harmonising the reporting obligations of 
parties167 and in connection with compliance.  A significant proportion of the decisions were 
aimed at enhancing institutional cooperation and requested that the parties in conjunction with 
the directors of the appropriate UN bodies168 explore options for joint management, including a 
joint head of the three secretariats.  Furthermore, the decisions established on an interim basis a 
joint resource mobilisation service within the secretariats of the respective conventions in 
Geneva.  It also authorised the establishment of joint financial, administrative legal, information 
technology and information services also on an interim basis.  Finally, the decisions 
recommended that Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm meetings should be held in a coordinated 
manner and, most significantly, that a simultaneous extraordinary meeting should be convened 
to further consider issues of cooperation and coordination.169 
 The first Simultaneous Extraordinary Meeting of the three MEAs was held in Bali in 
February 2010 and was organised as a back-to-back meeting with the eleventh session of the 
UNEP Governing Council / Global Ministerial Environmental Forum.  In his opening remarks 
to the meeting the Executive Director of UNEP noted that the “synergies process held the 
potential for a paradigm shift, through which the numerous and disparate instruments in 
existence would be managed holistically to achieve synergies of purpose and effort.”170 
Nevertheless, as a matter of process the autonomy of each MEA was maintained and proposals 
on both substantive and procedural matters were presented separately to each of the Presidents 
of the parties to his or her convention.  Decisions were taken separately by the conference of the 
parties to each convention.  However, in respect of the Omnibus Decisions the Presidents of 
each conference brought their gavels down simultaneously and declared in unison the adoption 
                                                 
164 Decisions VIII/8 (Basel, 2006); SC-2/15 (Stockholm, 2006); RC-3/8 (Rotterdam, 2006) all cited in full in note 
115 above.    See also UNEP/CHW.8/INF/28 Study on Improving Cooperation and synergies between the Secretariats of the 
Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (2006). 
165 See UNEP/FAO/CHW/RC/POPS/JWG.3/3 Report of the Ad hoc Joint Working Group on Enhancing Cooperation and 
Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions on the Work of its Third Meeting, Rome, 25 – 28 March 
2008.  See also UNEP/FAO/CHW/RC/POPS/JWG.1/4 Report of the Ad hoc Joint Working Group on Enhancing 
Cooperation and Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions on the Work of its First Meeting, 26 – 28 
March 2007; UNEP/FAO/CHW/RC/POPS/JWG.2/18 Report of the Ad hoc Joint Working Group on Enhancing 
Cooperation and Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions on the Work of its Second Meeting, Vienna, 
10 – 13 December 2007. 
166 See Decision IX/10 Cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (Basel, 2008); 
Decision RC-4/11 Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (Rotterdam, 
2008); SC-4/34 Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (Stockholm, 
2008). 
167 This recommendation was restricted to the reporting obligations under the Basel and Stockholm conventions 
only. 
168 These comprised the Executive Director of UNEP and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation.  
169 See the synergy decisions noted in footnote 167 above. 
170 See the Report of the simultaneous extraordinary meetings of the conferences of the parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
conventions, Bali, 22 – 24 February 2010, UNEP/FAO//CHW/RC/POPS/EXCOPS.1/8 at para. 7. 
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of the decisions in a gesture symbolising the new cooperative and integrated approach to 
environmental governance.171  The Omnibus Decisions172 encourage the parties of all three 
conferences to implement the synergies decisions adopted in 2008.173  In particular, the Omnibus 
Decisions promote the full use of regional centres and encourages the parties to report on their 
joint activities and programmatic cooperation.174  Furthermore, the Decisions request that the 
three secretariats identify cross-cutting and joint activities that may be included in the 
programmes of work for each of the three conventions.175  Moreover, the interim joint services 
designed to support all three secretariats as set out in the synergies decisions were endorsed by 
the parties through the Omnibus Decision176 and, most significantly, the Decisions authorise the 
creation of a joint head function to manage the three conventions.177  These arrangements are 
due to be reviewed at the ordinary meetings of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions 
in 2013.178 
 The relationship between the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions represent the 
clearest example of clustering to date.  These three MEAs have built upon the clear overlaps and 
links between the substance and functions of their respective conventions in order to create an 
integrated management and administrative structure whilst acknowledging the autonomy each 
instrument within its own regulatory sphere.  The initiatives developed in the 2008 synergies 
decisions and confirmed in the 2010 Omnibus Decision are designed to improve implementation 
through mutual support, cognitive interaction, efficiency savings and ultimately, joint 
management.  It is important to acknowledge that in 2006 when the process of review was 
initiated that neither secretariat established under the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions 
were fully functional.  Pragmatically, this meant that there were fewer institutional obstacles to 
the creation of joint managerial and administrative functions.  Nevertheless, the inherent logic of 
clustering as is being developed by these MEAs is abundantly clear.  Although it is too soon to 
assess the success of this arrangement, it is likely that other MEAs that might be similarly 
clustered, will be watching the progress of the chemicals cluster closely.    
 
c) Cooperation and Compliance 
 
The third category of institutional cooperation focuses on institutional interaction in the 
context of compliance.  A natural consequence of the proliferation of both treaties and non-
compliance mechanisms179 is the conflation and possible conflict between proceedings in the 
event that a state is alleged to be in breach of its obligations under two or more MEAs.180  One 
                                                 
171 Ibid at paras. 10 and 27. 
172 All three decisions are identical apart from a small number of minor differences between their preambles.  See 
BC.Ex-1/1 Omnibus decision adopted by the conference of the parties to the Basel Convention reproduced in Annex I of the 
Report, op cit. n. 171. 
173 Ibid, para. I.2. 
174 Ibid, paras. I.4 – I.7. 
175 Ibid, para. I.9. 
176 Ibid, paras, III.1 – III.7. 
177 Ibid, para II.3. 
178 Ibid, para. VI.1. 
179 There are over twenty non-compliance mechanisms in operation today and a further four are in the advance 
stages of negotiation.  See Karen N Scott, “Non-compliance Procedures and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms under 
International Environmental Agreements” in Duncan French and Nigel White (eds), International Law and Dispute 
Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (Oxford: Hart) (2010) 225 – 270 at 225.  See further, Jan Kabbers, 
“Compliance Procedures” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (2007) 995 – 1009; Tullio Treves et al (ed) Non-
Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press) (2009). 
180 The relationship between non-compliance mechanisms and dispute resolution is a further source of possible 
conflation and conflict but due to space constraints, will not be discussed in this article.  See further M. Fitzmaurice 
and C. Redgwell, “Environmental Non-compliance Procedures and International Law” XXXI (2000) Netherlands 
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high profile example of such conflation arose out of the dispute between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom over the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) reprocessing plant under construction on 
the north west coast of the UK in the early 1990s.  Ireland initiated proceedings under the 1982 
UNCLOS181 and separately under the 1992 OSPAR Convention182 against the UK, although the 
dispute ultimately became dominated by the question of division of competencies as between 
the EC and its member states with respect to marine environmental protection.183  Notably, 
there was little if any institutional interaction between the bodies variously charged with 
resolving the dispute.184 More recently – and rather more positively from the perspective of 
institutional cooperation – the Ukraine‟s controversial decision to construct the Danube-Black 
Sea shipping Canal in the Bystroe estuary of the Danube Delta led neighbouring state Romania 
and an interested NGO (Ecopravo-Lviv (EPL)) to institute compliance proceedings under five 
separate MEAs: the 1998 Aarhus Convention;185 the 1979 Bern Convention; the 1979 
Migratory Species Convention; the 1991 Espoo Convention186 and the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention.  Whilst the obligations alleged to have been breached under the various 
conventions are not identical,187 they are nevertheless closely related and mutually reinforcing. 
 To date, only a minority of non-compliance mechanisms have included provisions that 
expressly address their relationship and extent of interaction with other non-compliance 
mechanisms and external bodies.188 Four non-compliance mechanisms currently permit their 
compliance committee or other relevant body to consult with other relevant organisations and 
/ or to solicit advice or information from other compliance mechanisms as appropriate: the 
Technical and Compliance Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission;189 the Compliance Committee of the 1998 Aarhus Convention;190 the Compliance 
Committee of the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health;191 and the Compliance Committee of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yearbook of International Law 35 - 65; G. Handl, “Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental 
Obligations” 5 (1997) Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 29 - 49; Karen N. Scott, Ibid at 254 – 258; 
181 The MOX Plant Case, Ireland v. UK, Request for Provisional Measures Order, December 3 2001 reproduced in 41 
(2002) ILM 405; The MOX Plant Case, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Order No. 3, Suspension of Proceedings on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, reproduced in 42 ILM (2003) 1187. 
182Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, Ireland v. UK, Final Award (2 July 
2003) reproduced in 42 ILM (2003) 1118.  
183 ECJ 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland [2006] ECR 1-4635. 
184 See further, Robin Churchill and Joanne Scott, “The MOX Plant Litigation: The First Half-Life” 53 (2004) ICLQ 
643–676; Karen N. Scott, “The MOX Case before the European Court C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland” 22 (2007) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 303 – 316. 
185 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in decision-making and access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus), 38 (1999) ILM 517 (in force 29 October 2001). 
186 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo) 30 (1971) ILM 
802 (in force 27 June 1997).  
187 Alleged breaches variously referred to issues connected to an apparent failure to provide for appropriate public 
participation in the decision to build the canal, a lack of consultation with neighbouring states and the impact of the 
scheme on a vulnerable ecosystem and associated migratory and wetland species.  For the background to this case 
see Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, “An Overview of Stakeholder Participation – What Current Practice and Future 
Challenges? Case Study of the Danube Delta” 18 (2007) Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 
611 - 632; Tanya D. Sobol, “An NGO‟s Fight to Save Ukraine‟s Danube Delta: The Case for Granting Non-
governmental Organizations Formal Powers of Enforcement” 17 (2006) Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 123 - 163;  
188 See generally Cesare Pitea, “Multiplication and Overlap of Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms: 
Towards Better Coordination?” in Tullio Treves et al (ed) Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness 
of International Environmental Agreements (The Hague: TMC Asser Press) (2009) 439 – 450. 
189 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC), Article 11(5). 
190 Decision I/7(2002) Review of Compliance ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8   2 April 2004 at para. 39. 
191 1999 Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water 
Courses and International Lakes 29 (1999) EPL 200 (in force 4 August 2005).  See Decision I/2 (2007) Review of 
Compliance, ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3  EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3  3 July 2007 at para. 37.  Paragraph 38 of Decision 
I/2 permits the Committee to transmit information to the secretariats of other MEAs for consideration in 
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the 1995 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean.192 Furthermore, the 
draft texts of the two compliance procedures in the advanced stages of negotiation under the 
auspices of the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent193 and the 2001 
Stockholm Convention on POPs194 also permit the Compliance Committee to solicit 
information from other compliance committees dealing with hazardous substances and wastes.  
 No non-compliance mechanism has thus far developed formal procedures for 
coordinating on-the-ground information gathering missions and for facilitating the issue of 
coherent and complementary non-compliance measures.  These issues are however, under 
consideration by the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions pursuant to the directive 
issued by the conferences of parties under the synergies decisions adopted in 2008195 and by the 
five tuna RFMOs as part of the Kobe cooperation process.196  Nevertheless, a successful ad 
hoc joint compliance operation has been initiated in connection with the Brystoe Canal 
development referred to above.  Representatives from the five MEAs within which non-
compliance proceedings had been initiated by Romania together with the European 
Commission and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River 
(ICPDR) conducted a joint fact finding mission in the Ukraine in 2004.197  Furthermore in 2008 
the Secretariat of the 1991 Espoo Convention organised an informal consultation among 
interested MEA bodies with a view to considering possible measures that might be taken to 
support the Ukraine to comply with its international obligations.198  This was followed by two 
further joint Missions – in July 2008 and September 2009 led by the secretariats of the Bern 
Convention and the Espoo Convention respectively.199 At the most recent Informal 
Consultation Meeting held in June 2009 and attended by the secretariats of five MEAs and 
representatives from a further four organisations the following joint statement was issued: 
 
The organizations agreed: (a) to continue to work together; (b) each to notify the other 
organizations on the outcomes of key events in the following months (including meetings of 
the parties); (c) to meet again within one year to continue to exchange information and 
experiences of specific issues common to the agreements and also to review developments 
on the matter discussed present meeting.  The Organizations noted with concern the recent 
                                                                                                                                                        
accordance with their applicable procedures on compliance.  The Committee may invite members of other 
compliance committees dealing with issues related to those before it for consultation. 
192 1995 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Region of the Mediterranean 
(Barcelona Convention) (in force 9 July 2004).  Text available online at: 
http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/bc95_Eng_p.pdf. See Decision IG 17/2 (2008) Procedures and 
Mechanisms on Compliance under the Barcelona Convention and its Protocol, para. 37. 
193 See Decision RC-4/7 (2008) Procedures and mechanisms on compliance with the Rotterdam Convention.  The draft text is 
annexed to this decision and the relevant paragraph number is 28. 
194 See Decision SC-4/33 (2009) Procedures and mechanisms on compliance with the Stockholm Convention.  The draft text is 
annexed to this decision and the relevant paragraph is number 35.  In contrast to the draft compliance decision 
negotiated under the auspices of the Rotterdam Convention, which permits the Compliance Committee to solicit 
additional information from other committees on the request of the Meeting of the Parties or directly, the draft 
decision under the Stockholm Convention has imposed square brackets around the text that would permit the 
Compliance Committee to seek information directly from other institutions without the prior permission of the 
Meeting of the Parties. 
195 See Decision IX/10 Cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions (2008) at paras. 
B.2 and B.3. 
196 See the Report of the Joint Meeting of the Tuna RFMOs, January 22 – 26 2007, Kobe, Appendix 14; Report of the 
RFMOs Chairs’ Meeting, San Francisco, February 5 – 6 2008 at para. 3(d). 
197 Joint Mission of the Expert Team of the European Commission and International Conventions to the „Brystoe 
project‟ in the Ukrainian part of the Danube Delta (6 – 8 October 2004).  Report available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/bystroe_docs/bystroe_joint_mission_report.pdf.  
198 Letter from the Executive Secretary of the UNECE to the Ministry of Environmental Protection of Ukraine (Ref 
ECE/EHLM/104/2008/1) and Background Note dated 9 May 2008 on file with author. 
199 Personal communication from the secretariat of the 1991 Espoo Convention dated 15 July 2010 (on file with 
author). 
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developments related to the construction of the Brystroe Canal, which seem to contradict 
the formal communications from authorities in Ukraine and may lead to breaching 
provisions of relevant multilateral environmental agreements.  The organizations agreed to 
discuss at the next meeting possible concerted actions to ensure compliance by the 
government of the Ukraine with relevant international agreements and decisions taken by 
international organizations.200 
 
This ad hoc informal arrangement between the institutions of up to seven different MEAs, 
which focuses on not only information sharing but also on the development of mutually 
reinforcing compliance measures, demonstrates the possible extent and depth of potential 
cooperation between non-compliance bodies.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite 
six years of apparently fruitful cooperation among these institutions, the Ukraine remains in non-
compliance with a number of its treaty obligations in connection with the Brystoe Canal project.  
Moreover, it is far from certain that states parties to MEAs more generally would be keen to 
develop formal cooperative arrangements with respect to compliance or establish joint 
compliance institutions.  It is notable that members of the ad hoc joint working group on 
enhancing cooperation among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions demonstrated 
minimal enthusiasm for the idea of a joint compliance committee for the three conventions.201  
Given that the report of the working group recommended – and indeed led to – unprecedented 
and wide-ranging integration initiatives amongst the three chemicals conventions, their 
reservations over a joint compliance committee is significant.  However, there are a wide range 
of measures short of full institutional integration that might be adopted by MEAs to promote 
the exchange of information and to facilitate the adoption of compatible and mutually 
supportive compliance measures. 
 
PART III 
 
6. SELECTED RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION AND CLOSER 
COOPERATION 
 
Whilst it is generally agreed that institutional integration will improve and strengthen 
environmental governance leading to a more effective implementation of environmental 
commitments, there are also risks associated with closer cooperation.   
First, from the perspectives of states – and potentially other participants – there is a risk 
that they may become drawn into regimes which they are not party to or affiliated with, but by 
virtue of a cooperative arrangement, may become implicitly subject to that regime‟s obligations.  
For example, Argentina has recently expressed significant reservations in respect of CCAMLR‟s 
participation in the Regional Fisheries Bodies Secretariat Network (RSN).  In particular, 
Argentina is concerned about the “implications for CCAMLR of an institutional and collective 
involvement with organisations which differ from CCAMLR in their objectives and 
membership.”202  Argentina‟s objection to this cooperative arrangement between CCAMLR and 
the RSN appears to result from the fact that it is not a party to the 1995 Fish Stocks 
                                                 
200 Note: Current activities related to the Brystoe canal project under multilateral environmental agreements and by intergovernmental 
organizations (28 September 2009) (on file with author). 
201 Report of the ad hoc joint working group on enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
conventions on the work of its second meeting, Vienna, 10 – 13 December 2007 
(UNEP/FAO/CHW/RC/POPS/JWG.2/18) at para. 36.  One member commented that a joint compliance 
committee was a “long term option” and another said that such a committee “could not be envisaged.”  A third 
member indicated that “the scope for coordinated activities on compliance overall was very limited.” 
202 See the Report of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the CCAMLR Commission (2009) at para. 15.17. 
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Agreement203 and that it does not consider the Agreement to be part of customary international 
law.204  Implicitly, Argentina appears to regard the increased institutional cooperation between 
RFMOs under the auspices of the RSN as supporting the implementation of the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement and, more significantly, contributing to the process of incorporating that 
Agreement into customary international law.  From an environmental perspective this risk as 
perceived by states and other participants may have positive effects; increasing participation 
within environmental and fishery regimes directly or indeed indirectly will likely contribute to 
better and more comprehensive environmental management.  However, there is – at least 
potentially – a further risk in that a state or other participant that objects strongly to a 
cooperative arrangement may withdraw from the cooperating regime altogether. 
 The second risk arises from the possibility that through participating in a cooperative 
arrangement, a regime or institution may overreach its regulatory mandate and may act in a 
manner which might be considered ultra vires.  This may occur if the cooperative arrangement has 
the practical effect of extending the geographic scope of the regime or where the subject matter 
of the regime has been expanded to include species, ecosystems, substances or issues not 
previously regulated by that regime.  For example, during the negotiations within the CCAMLR 
Commission in connection with the proposed MOU with ACAP in 2009, there was some 
disagreement over whether the Commission was entitled to regulate activities taking place 
outside of the CCAMLR area.205  Whilst Argentina was firmly of the view that activities outside 
of the CCAMLR area are beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission,206 Australia, New Zealand, 
the UK and the USA disagreed.207  Australia asserted an expansive view of the Commission‟s 
regulatory mandate, which supported the adoption of conservation measures of application 
outside the CCAMLR area where those measures are designed to conserve Antarctic marine 
living resources situated within the CCAMLR area.208  Whilst the development of – particularly 
wide-ranging – cooperative arrangements may lead to tensions within individual respective 
regimes, the implicit expansion of a regime‟s or institution‟s regulatory mandate may nevertheless 
have positive implications for the effectiveness of environmental protection overall.  
The third risk is associated with the cooperative arrangement itself and its participating 
regimes and institutions rather than with the individual states parties and other participants 
within those regimes.  Where a cooperative or institutional integrated management arrangement 
comprises participants that are unequal in size or status it is possible that the arrangement may 
become dominated by those participants.  This may lead to the prioritisation of the dominant 
participant‟s interests and objectives and ultimately, may result in the diversion of scarce 
resources away from the priorities of other participants.  Similarly, it is also possible that a 
cooperative arrangement may become dominated by procedures, principles and concepts that are 
prevalent within one regime at the expense of other procedures, principles and concepts that are 
utilised within other regimes and institutions.  This has already occurred to a limited extent 
within the Biodiversity Liaison Group, which is dominated by the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.  
A degree of tension as noted above has already occurred within this Group between a number of 
the participants over differences in priorities – including the 2010 Biodiversity Target – and the 
allocation of scarce resources.209  Nevertheless, this risk can be mitigated with relative ease 
through careful drafting of the cooperative agreement within which priorities, procedures and 
                                                 
203 The UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995 (in force 2001).  
Text available online at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement.  
204 See the Report of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the CCAMLR Commission (2009) at paras. 5.18 – 5.19. 
205 Ibid at para. 15.8. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid at para. 15.9. 
208 Ibid at para. 15.10. 
209 See the text accompanying notes 148 and 149 above. 
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principles agreed upon by all participants are clearly set out and which includes appropriate 
provisions for protecting the autonomy of the respective participating regimes and institutions. 
Finally, increased integration and closer cooperation may in rare instances simply transfer 
a problematic issue from one regime to another without resolving the problem and with 
potentially dire consequences for the future effectiveness of that other regime.  For example, it 
has been suggested that the parties to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty should address Japanese 
scientific whaling activities located within the Southern Ocean through the ATCM.  In light of 
the fact that the whaling activities taking place are ostensibly “scientific” and that they are located 
within the Antarctic Treaty area, there is a strong legal argument for suggesting such activities 
should be subject to the principles of environmental impact assessment under Article 8 and 
Annex I of the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.210  Irrespective of the 
legal merits of this argument211 the political implications of involving the Antarctic Treaty directly 
or indirectly – through increased cooperation with the IWC – in the scientific whaling dispute 
could be disastrous.  The disagreement over Japanese scientific whaling has polarised and 
virtually paralysed the International Whaling Commission to the extent that its very existence has 
been called into question.  By contrast, the Antarctic Treaty system works well – notwithstanding 
the dispute over scientific whaling – principally because thus far it has sensibly avoided directly 
addressing Japanese whaling activities within the ATCM.212 In the Antarctic it might be suggested 
that fragmentation helps rather than hinders effective environmental governance!  
The risks identified above relate to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of 
international environmental governance.  In particular, increasing and more complex cooperative 
institutional arrangements raise important questions of accountability.  This is particularly the 
case where the cooperative arrangements comprise or are largely driven by treaty secretariats 
rather than by the states parties themselves.  It has been noted that “while environmental 
governance by no means achieves a democratic or deliberative ideal, it is among the most 
transparent, participatory, and accessible realms of global governance to state and non-state 
actors alike.”213  The development of cooperative and integrated institutional regimes in pursuit 
of effectiveness should not come at the expense of legitimacy and accountability.  Ideally, the 
development of governance solutions based on cooperation and institutional integration should 
be designed to promote both effectiveness and legitimacy.  The clustering of the Basel, 
Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions provides an excellent example of such an arrangement.  
                                                 
210 The extent of the relationship between the Environmental Protocol and the 1946 International Convention on 
the Regulation of Whaling is unclear.  Annex II of the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 
which sets out restrictions in connection with the taking or harmful interference of species, is not applicable to 
Japanese whaling activities as it contains a without prejudice clause, which confirms that “[n]othing in this Annex 
shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Parties under the International Convention on the Regulation of 
Whaling” (Annex II, Article 7).   There is no such clause in Annex I of the Environmental Protocol or in the 
Protocol itself.  However, the Final Act of the Eleventh Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at which the 
Protocol was adopted stipulates that “[t]he meeting noted that nothing in the Protocol shall derogate from the right 
and obligations of Parties under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals and the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling.” (para. 7).   
211 A discussion of the merits is beyond the scope of this article.  For a detailed analysis of some of the issues raised 
by Japanese whaling issues within the Southern Ocean see the special issue of the 11(3) & (4) (2008) Asia Pacific 
Journal of Environmental Law.  
212 The closest the ATCM has come to discussing Japanese whaling was in 2007 when New Zealand presented 
Information Paper 40 (2007) relating to the fire on board the Japanese whaling vessel the Nisshin Maru, which took 
place in February 2007.  The discussion at the XXX ATCM focused on the safety and search and rescue aspects of 
this incident and was promptly shut down by Japan which stated that “it would not be constructive to further 
discuss the Nisshin Maru incident in the next Meeting because further discussion on this incident might lead to 
discussion on the whaling issue, on which Parties had differing views.”  See the Final Report of the Thirtieth Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting, New Delhi, 30 April – 11 May 2007 at paras. 225 – 231. 
213 Steven Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance” 1 (2005) Journal of International Law and 
Relations 139 - 166 at 140. 
Third Four Societies Conference, 26 – 28 August 2010, International Law in the New Era of Globalization  
Draft Paper: Conflation of and Conflict between Regulatory Mandates in International Environmental Law, Karen Scott  
 
29 
 
The development of the chemicals cluster has been driven by the states parties themselves and 
decisions relating to substance, administration and management have been taken by both 
ordinary and extraordinary conferences of parties.  It is notable that the less ambitious – and 
arguably less effective – examples of the Biodiversity Liaison Group and (to a lesser extent) the 
five tuna RFMOs acting collectively pursuant to the Kobe process, are both driven by treaty 
institutions without direct involvement of state parties.  Consequently, it would appear that states 
parties to MEAs must themselves play a meaningful role in developing cooperative and 
integrated governance mechanisms, not only with a view to promoting legitimacy and 
accountability but ultimately, effectiveness.   
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ENHANCING INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The processes of globalisation and fragmentation of international law cannot be reversed but can 
be managed.  Moreover, governance mechanisms such as institutional cooperation and 
integration offer substantial potential to not only manage but to exploit the overlaps and 
synergies that exist between MEAs and environmental institutions in order to improve 
environmental protection.  To a greater or lesser extent many MEAs – often as a result of 
institutional initiatives – are already beginning to engage in project and programmatic 
collaboration, integrated or even joint administration and management of MEAs and 
cooperation with respect to implementation and compliance mechanisms.  Whilst these 
initiatives are broadly aimed at improving the effectiveness of MEAs they can also enhance their 
legitimacy at the national, regional or international level.  Nevertheless, extensive cooperation 
and institutional integration also poses risks – actual and perceived – to the legitimacy and 
accountability of MEAs to their states parties.  Maximising the potential of institutional 
cooperation and integration, whilst minimising its risks to legitimacy, accountability and indeed 
effectiveness, is likely to prove a significant challenge for future international environmental 
governance.  One possible response to that challenge is to deliberately manage institutional 
integration and other cooperative arrangements through an overarching global environmental 
institution such as a strengthened UNEP214 or even a newly created „world environmental 
organisation.‟215   
                                                 
214 UNEP as an organisation has been subject to consistent and cogent criticism over its performance almost since 
its inception.  All four  UN-related international environmental governance reform processes noted in Part I of this 
article (see text accompanying notes 26 – 35 above) recommended that consideration be given to strengthening 
UNEP through enhancing its legal mandate, opening it up to universal membership, improving its financial basis 
and turning it into the „environmental pillar‟ of the UN.  For a critical assessment of UNEP‟s performance see: 
Steinar Andresen, “The Effectiveness of UN environmental institutions” 7 (2007) International Environmental 
Agreements 317 – 336; Steffen Bauer, “The Secretariat of the United Nations Environment Programme: Tangled up 
on the Blue” in Frank Bierman and Bernd Siebenhüner (eds) Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International 
Environmental Bureaucracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press) (2009) 169 – 201; Maria Ivanova, “UNEP as 
anchor organisation for the global environment” in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyögg, 
International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance (London: Routledge) (2009) 151 – 173; Philippe Roche 
and Franz Zaver Perrez, “International Environmental Governance: The Strive Towards a Comprehensive, 
Coherent, Effective and Efficient Environmental Regime” 16 (2005) Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy 1 – 26. 
215 The creation of a new „world environment organisation‟ has been suggested by a number of commentators.  See 
Frank Bierman et al, “Environmental policy integration and the architecture of global environmental governance” 9 
(2009) International Environmental Agreements 351 – 369; Dena Marshall, “An Organization for the World 
Environment: Three Models and Analysis” 15 (2002 - 2003) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 79 – 
103.  For a critical view of the „world environment organisation‟ proposal see Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas 
Gehring, “Reforming International Environmental Governance: An Institutional Critique of the Proposal for a 
World Environment Organisation” 4 (2004) International Environmental Agreements: Politics Law and Economics 359 – 
381. 
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 Regardless of how initiatives promoting institutional integration or cooperation are 
managed in the context of future international environmental governance, there is little doubt 
that their impact is already challenging the traditional landscape of international law.  Non-state 
actors have long been present within the field of international environmental law but they are 
becoming increasingly dominant through their participation within the areas of creation, 
implementation and enforcement of international environmental law.  The vast number of 
decisions, resolutions, agreements and other instruments are all integral components of the rich 
tapestry of an MEA, and the hard distinction between binding and non-binding instruments is 
increasingly blurred.  Moreover, the very nature of international law as a system of law based on 
the consent of states is being brought into question. The development of complex systems of 
cooperation and integration in practice has the potential to lead to the development of norms 
outside of the fora within which states normally give their consent.  This may occur in 
circumstances where MEA institutions acting collectively develop norms that become binding on 
states without their formal acceptance or where the practice of MEAs acting individually or 
collectively contributes the formation of customary international law.  The potential impact of 
these new forms of international environmental governance thus extends well beyond the realm 
of international environmental law; they challenge the very fundamentals of the system itself – 
who we regard as participants within the system, the sources of international law and even its 
ultimate basis in consent.       
 
 
 
 
 
